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Abstract: Value capture (VC) could be a useful tool to address the huge demand for public 
transport infrastructure funding in China. This research identifies the opportunities and 
challenges faced by VC implementation in China and explains how local governments and 
local transit agencies dealt with the regulatory barriers. The findings of this research offer 
insights including: (1) macro environment, regulatory framework, and supportive policy 
environment provide opportunities to adopt VC projects, while the risk of acquiring land vale 
cannot be isolated from the global political and economic situations; (2) the regulatory 
challenges of land transactions and lack of property tax system restrict the application of VC; 
(3) evidence from the case study of Shenzhen demonstrates that local government may 
creatively deal with the regulatory challenges to do VC and benefit local community; and (4) 
institutional capacity is vital to implement VC. The analysis of Shenzhen experience can 
provide a reference for other Chinese cities to implement VC.  
  
Keywords: Value Capture, Transportation Funding, Macro-economic Factors, Regulatory 





Worldwide countries invest US$1‒$2 trillion every year in transport infrastructure to meet the 
world’s demand for mobility and connectivity, and the investment in transport infrastructure 
rise at a stable annual rate, averaging about 5% between 2014 and 2025 (The World Bank, 
2015). Public transport infrastructure is in a great demand because of rapid urbanization and 
economic growth (Pojani and Stead, 2015). However, traditional government funding (e.g. 
fares, government funding, and subsidies) for public transport infrastructure is not sufficient 
to meet this growing demand and innovative funding mechanisms are needed (Medda, 2012; 
Imran and Pearce, 2013; Verma and Ramanayya, 2014).  
The demand for public transport infrastructure in urban areas arises because public 
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transport can improve accessibility and amenity and provide an opportunity for agglomeration 
economies to emerging in the surrounding urban areas (Suzuki et al., 2015). Therefore, public 
transport investment has tendency to increase the value of the surrounding land and properties, 
and some of this increase can be captured for building or extending public transport 
infrastructure (Cervero and Kang, 2011). Value capture (VC) mechanisms have potential to 
become an innovative funding method for developing public transport infrastructure (Cervero 
and Murakami, 2009). To date, VC has been utilized successfully in many regions such as 
Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, the UK, and the US. 
China has adopted VC mechanism recently after receiving policy support from the 
central government, and some research has focused on the land value uplift (Xu et al., 2016; 
Pan and Zhang, 2008; Tian, 2006). There is little research systematically analyzing the 
underlying factors that obstruct or support VC implementation in the context of China. 
However, VC is a complex process, which needs negotiation and collaboration among the 
public and private sectors and local community, thus it should be carefully planned in the 
local context of urbanization, land use regulations, property market and urban planning policy.  
This paper aims to identify the opportunities and challenges to implement VC in 
Chinese cities. This research uses the institutional nature of partnership as a theoretical 
framework, and selects Shenzhen as a case study to investigate the macro and regulatory 
environment and institutional capacity for VC related to transportation projects. The paper 
explores how VC works at the local level in Shenzhen to generate lessons for other Chinese 
cities. 
Section 2 critically reviews literature on VC followed by theoretical framework and the 
research design for this paper. Section 3 identifies the opportunities and challenges to conduct 
VC in China from the perspectives of institutional framework, policy environment, macro 
environment, and regulatory framework. Section 4 uses the Shenzhen as a case study to 
analyze how to bypass the regulation barriers at the local level and how to share revenues of 
VC to local community. Final section discusses the opportunities and challenges of VC in 
Shenzhen, conclude the research and offer some recommendations to other cities in China.    
 
 
2. VALUE CAPTURE – CONCEPT AND FRAMEWORK  
 
2.1 The Idea of VC  
 
VC can be defined as a mechanism by which the public sector can recoup part or all of the 
cost of high-quality public transport systems by capturing incremental value increases in 
nearby land and property (Jillella et al., 2015; Smith and Gihring, 2006). VC concept can be 
traced back to Henry George’s land reform concept in the late 19th century in the US (Batt, 
2001). George discovered that gains in property values happened as a result of nearby public 
investment (Fainstein, 2012). Subsequently, many authors have argued that the state should 
benefit from the increased value of private lands if land value increase as a result of public 
actions such as change of land use regulation, an increase in the urban population, and 
investment priorities (Suzuki et al., 2015; Ingram and Hong, 2012) (see Figure 1). For 
example, if the construction of a railway leads to value being added in nearby properties, and 
population growth results in the growth of real estate prices, the increased value should at 
least be shared between landowners and the government.  
 





Figure 1. The relationship between beneficiaries and land value (Hong and Brubaker, 2010) 
 
Suzuki et al. (2015) distinguished two types of VC: development-based VC and 
taxation-based VC. Development-based VC uses direct land and property transactions to 
capture the increases in value by selling or leasing land or property, air rights, joint property 
development, land readjustments, and urban redevelopment schemes (Salon and Shewmake, 
2011). In this case, transport agencies and private developers plan the land near railway 
stations, bus stops, or airport terminals for future development of high-density properties such 
as residential and commercial buildings, and offices. Hong Kong and Japan both have the best 
practices for this VC instrument. Taxation-based VC refers to charging or levying extra or 
special taxes or fees on existing development located in “transit investment benefitting areas” 
to capture the land and property value increases (Walters and Rosengard, 2012). In this 
situation, the tools such as tax increment financing, special assessments, land or property 
taxes, and betterment levy often are used (Chapman, 2017). This kind of method is more 
suitable for a country that has a legislative or regulatory history to support ‘special’ taxation 
measures such as Australia and the US (McIntosh et al., 2015). 
Both types of value capture mechanisms have different implications for capturing 
incremental land value in practice. In the case of development-based VC, it can be seen as 
one‐time funding sources which depends on the accuracy of assessment of increases in land 
and property value. As Salon and Shewmake (2011) pointed out, if the value assessments are 
correct, then this is a fair system for all stakeholders. However, the expected value can be 
much higher (or lower) than the realized value, one or another of the stakeholders will be 
unfairly treated. By contrast, taxation-based VC is a category of continuous funding that can 
be used to subsidize the ongoing constructing and operating costs of transport infrastructure 
(Romana and Modelewska, 2009). As the capitalized market value of the public transportation 
system is revealed, revenues of taxation-based VC instruments are gradually and naturally 
self-correcting over time (Gielen, 2011). The pros and cons of two categories of VC is shown 
in Table 1.  
 
 




Table 1. Pros and cons of two types of VC 
 Pros Cons 
Development-based 
VC 
Quickly create a lot of VC revenues; 
Potential to contribute to the capital cost 
of public transport. 
No ongoing source of land-based 
revenues; 
Potential to excessively rely on the 
real estate market.  
Taxation-based 
VC 
Generate a continuous source of revenue; 
Revenues are gradually and naturally 
self-correcting over time based on the 
market value. 
Require an efficient taxation 
system where has legislative and 
regulatory support. 
 
Source: adopted from Salon and Shewmake (2011) 
 
2.2 Why Land and Property Value Increases Due to Transport Improvement? 
 
Many studies have demonstrated a positive link between proximity to urban transit rail 
stations or bus stops and land value (Sharma and Newman, 2018; Cervero and Murakami, 
2009; Cervero and Duncan, 2002; Cervero, 1997). These studies identifies three benefits of 
urban transit investment leading to the land value increases (Baker and Nunns, 2015), which 
we describe below. 
1) Accessibility: Accessibility can improve economic goals (i.e. workers, customers, 
and suppliers), social goals (i.e. access to jobs, healthcare, education, and shopping), 
and environmental goals (i.e. energy savings and emission reductions) (Handy, 2002). 
In this case, improved accessibility is capitalized to the land value, and it is reflected 
as higher purchase or rent prices for properties.  
2) Amenity: Amenity implies the direct feelings related to using the public transport 
infrastructure. For example, travellers prefer to enjoy their travel with quality stations 
and stops, as well as good air quality and excellent services. Amenity improvements 
also bring land value increases. For example, a study of Australia showed that there 
is a 22% difference in property value with high transit amenity compared with 
properties with low transit amenity in Perth and Brisbane (McIntosh et al., 2011).  
3) Agglomeration: Agglomeration increases the labour force willing to work in the area 
that leads to improvements in productivity, controlled wages, and higher company 
revenue (Song et al., 2012). Furthermore, agglomeration is capitalised into land value, 
through office rents (Drennan and Kelly, 2010). Agglomeration causes high rents for 
property in proximity to transport infrastructure, especially in CBDs.  
      
 Therefore, there is a positive feedback loop between urban public transport infrastructure 
benefits (accessibility, amenity, and agglomeration) and land value increases, making VC 
possible. However, there is some indication that proximity to public transport infrastructure 
may reduce land value, probably because of noise, pollution, and congestion (Debrezion et al., 
2011; Carey and Semmens, 2003). To achieve a positive link between public transport and 
land values, a legislative, institutional and policy environment are important. Institutional 
environment that supports a particular land use policy, the city’s economic environment, and 
funding availability for transport investment will all affect the accessibility, amenity, and 
agglomeration to be capitalized in increased land values (Suzuki et al., 2015). 
 
2.3 Institutions of VC 
 
VC is a complex process, involving multiple actors, and can apply different policies and 
regulations to explore how the value is to be captured, by whom, and in what amounts. 




Therefore, an appropriate institutional framework is required for VC to work (McIntosh et al., 
2015). This institutional framework may include a clear structure and role of different actors 
in VC processes, and related government regulations and policies that identifies a clear 
relationship between urban planning and transportation planning, the land administration 
system and taxation regulations (Suzuki et al., 2015). In some cases, stakeholders follow the 
current legislation and prove that existing legislation can be applied for the VC without 
waiting for the national legislation. So VC behavior can be found at the local level even where 
there is no national legislation existing (Smolka, 2012). 
Suzuki et al. (2015) studied VC in various cities and identified that urban planning (e.g. 
land use planning and transportation planning) plays a crucial role in making VC successful. 
Hong Kong’s Rail + Property model is a successful value capture model adopted by Hong 
Kong Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC). This model enables the MTRC to capture 
the revenue from property development to fund and operate railway services without 
government subsidies. The MTRC buys the development rights for lands above and around 
transit stations from the Hong Kong Government by agreement at a ‘before rail’ market price, 
meaning the MTRC can acquire lands at a low price. The MTRC, in partnership with selected 
private developers, can then develop lands and sell developed property projects at an ‘after 
rail’ price, thereby capturing the increased land value (Suzuki et al., 2015). The profit from 
development between the ‘before rail’ and ‘after rail’ prices can bridge the funding gap for 
constructing and developing the projects (Zhao et al., 2012). Under this mechanism, the 
government enjoys significant capital returns because the Hong Kong Government has a 75% 
share of the MTRC.  
Hong Kong is one of the world’s most expensive cities for office rents and residential 
housing due to the scarcity of land, high population densities and high property values. These 
factors provide a foundation for R+ P model (Suzuki et al., 2015). In addition, a reason for the 
success of Hong Kong’s VC is that the Hong Kong Government has ownership of urban land, 
so the MTRC and the Hong Kong Government can profit from most of increases in land value 
resulting from rail and property development (Cervero and Murakami, 2009). Another reason 
contributes to the success of Hong Kong’s VC is that the MTRC can obtained lands from the 
government by agreements, ensuring the key position of the MTRC in VC projects. Notably, 
the Hong Kong Government also focuses on the benefits of local community. In fact, Hong 
Kong has a relatively sound property tax system, but Hong Kong does not rely on the 
taxation-based VC, that is, the local community can share the benefit of VC by tax exemption 
(Hui et al., 2004). Moreover, as the Hong Kong Government is the largest shareholder of 
Hong Kong MRT, so the government can use revenues from VC to improve the accessibility 
and amenity of public transport for local community again (Tang et al., 2004).   
Some countries have a long history with VC, and they may have passed explicit 
legislation for value capture. For example, the US has formulated the ‘Tax Increment 
Financing’ legislation for VC. Under the state legislation, Tax increment financing is 
implemented by creating a geographic district and is administered by tax increment financing 
authority for a period. As new funds are invested by private developers, the property values in 
the district increase and generate the property tax revenues. The tax increment is diverted to 
the tax increment financing authority, and is used for the improvement of the district 
(Chapman, 2017; McIntosh et al., 2017).  
In addition, the argument is that identifying who has what role in VC processes is 
important to VC work. The public sector may play roles as planners, policymakers, and 
collaborators to make sure VC, from planning to implementation, is reliable and transparent 
(Jillella et al., 2015). Generally, different levels of governments play their own roles in the VC 
process. For example, in Sao Paulo, Brazil, the federal government is responsible for 




formulating standards for urban planning and transit-oriented development projects in cities. 
The state and city governments are responsible for rail transit and integrated transport 
networks across metropolitan areas, while local agencies control part of the urban transport 
system and land use planning in local level (Suzuki et al., 2015). In the US, VC is 
administered at the state, regional and city levels, and the federal government is in charge of 
offering the federal capital share for the costs of construction and land acquisition; thus, the 
federal government has an indirect implementation role in VC. However, federal policies and 
plans may affect the costs and zoning plans of transport systems, which are critical to whether 
VC happens (US Government Accountability Office, 2010).  
The private sector usually undertakes responsibility for sharing the costs and risks with 
the public sector because of profits and revenues. This sharing happens because the private 
sector can benefit from the accessibility improvement through more potential customers and 
higher sale or rent for residential units or development projects On the other hand the public 
sector can benefit from sharing the construction costs of transport infrastructure and lease 
income (Medda, 2012). In addition, the local community’s willingness to participate is a 
significant factor for the success of VC (Jillella et al., 2015). The opinions of local community 
concerning transportation issues or feelings about the transportation infrastructure are 
essential to help shape the process of VC (Smolka, 2012).  
The fact is that different countries may have different government structures, different 
ways to formulate laws, regulations and policies, and different land ownership attributes (i.e. 
in Japan and the US, there is private land ownership, while in China and Singapore, the land 
belongs to the state), thus there is no one size legal and institutional framework that fits all 
thing in the value capture strategy, and we have to analyses the specific value capture 
mechanism based on case by case. 
For the research, we attempt to develop a conceptual framework based on public value 
management and partnership theories. These theories emphasize collaborative/partnership 
relationships between different actors that enables VC environment. These theories help in 
rethinking government role in policymaking, planning and service delivery (O'Flynn, 2007; 
Moore, 1995). Moreover, these theories can help establish appropriate institutional 
arrangements and financial arrangements, as well as delivering public goods and services 
(Hodge and Greve, 2007; Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2001). The research will extend the 
boundaries of these theories into institutional partnership, financial partnership and social 
partnership.  
However, this paper mainly focuses on the institutional nature of partnership to explore 
what are the opportunities and challenges to the use of VC for transportation projects in China, 
and how the institutional environment supports policy and planning tools that help the local 
government and the local transit agency to conduct VC projects. This paper answers a 
research question on how the local government and local transit agency address the regulatory 
challenges to develop VC projects in complex institutional environment. Based on 
institutional nature of partnership, this paper can provide a useful lens to explore strengths 
and weaknesses of VC projects using a case study. 
     This paper selects Shenzhen as a case study. Shenzhen is the first city in Mainland 
China to pursue the VC projects. It is worth investigating because VC provides a significant 
funding for the development of urban rail transit in Shenzhen. This research conducted 21 
semi-structured interviews with relevant stakeholders (government officials, planners, 
managers, and experts) in Shenzhen during a field trip in early 2019. This information was 
supplemented by internally and publicly available documents, metro company reports, and 
media news on Shenzhen’s VC projects. All information and data were first collected in 
Chinese and then translated in English.   




3. VC IN CHINA: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
 
3.1 Macro Factors 
 
3.1.1 Urbanization, economic growth, and transportation development 
The rapid urbanization, economic growth, and transportation demand is a pre-requisite for VC 
projects. China’s first- and second-tier cities have undergone rapid urbanization since China’s 
reform and opening-up policy in 1978 (He et al., 2016). From 1978 to 2016, the Chinese 
urban population increased from 173 million to 793 million (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2017). At the same time, the built-up urban areas in China has expanded from 7,438 
km2 to 52,761 km2. Rapid urbanization and continuous economic growth supported each other. 
For example, China has maintained an average of 7% economic growth over the last two 
decades, and reached at US$12,240.4 billion in 2017 (World Economic Forum, 2017). 
Urbanization and economic growth in China have increased motorization and ultimately 
congestion (Wang, 2010). For example, the average speed of cars on main roads in Chinese 
cities is around 10–15 km/h during a weekday in 2019. Traffic congestion also generates air 
pollution, and the World Bank study illustrated that in China’s large cities, car usage accounts 
for about 50% of total CO2 emissions (Darido et al., 2014).  
To address motorization and environmental issues, the central government published the 
Suggestions on Prioritizing the Development of Urban Public Transport, emphasizing 
investment in the urban public transport network in cities across China (State Council, 2012). 
This document identifies the priority development of public transport system such as rapid 
transit buses and railway-based transit systems in Chinese cities. To date, 34 cities in China 
have opened railway-based transit systems, comprising 165 railway lines with a total mileage 
of 5,033 kilometers (China Urban Rail Transit Association, 2018). Moreover, the central 
government has called for constructing 2,500 kilometres of metro lines by 2020, and the total 
mileage of metro systems completed will reach over 6,000 kilometres (State Council, 2017). 
In 2018, China (excluding Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) completed a total investment of 
547.02 billion yuan in urban rail transit construction, and the estimated investment in urban 
rail transit that has been approved to build is 4,268.85 billion yuan (China Urban Rail Transit 
Association, 2018).  
Recently, the State Council (2017) pointed out that based on the previous funding 
sources (e.g. public private partnership and government funding), a sound capture mechanism 
for the land value added by the development of urban transport should be established.  
 
3.1.2 Real estate market 
Apart from urbanization and economic growth, VC requires strong local property market 
demand. This is because transportation improvement can only enhance land values where 
property market demand exists (Suzuki et al., 2015), and when the real estate market is in a 
downturn, there may be a lack of incentives for real estate investment (Mu and Jong, 2012).  
    China has experienced remarkable progress in improving the urban housing market in a 
short period of time. Affected by the reform and opening up policy, the real estate market 
transformed from a central-planning approach to a market orientation. In 1998, the allocation 
of welfare housing from the state and stated owned enterprises was officially stopped, and 
policy where most citizens should buy commercial housing to satisfy their housing demands 
was instituted (Shi et al., 2016).       
A boom in the real estate markets in China has followed accompanied by a rapid rise in 
housing prices. Apart from a slight downward price adjustment in 2008 due to the shock of 
the global financial crisis, housing prices in urban China have maintained a strong upward 




trend (see Figure 2). However, this phenomenon has caused low-income person, especially 
young adults and rural to urban migrants, to struggle to meet higher housing prices. In this 
situation, to develop a healthy real estate market in China, the central government has 
launched a series of documents and instructions that strongly intervene in the Chinese real 
estate industry. These policies have required local governments to increase the construction of 
affordable housing since 2008 (Shen et al., 2018). For example, the State Council (2003) 
issued the Notice on Promoting the Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Real Estate 
Market to implement the urban housing development system, which mainly focuses on 
commodity housing and promotes the construction of affordable housing. Then, the State 
Council (2008) prepared Several Suggestions on Promoting Healthy Development of the Real 
Estate Market to speed up the establishment of a multi-channel system that addresses the 
housing difficulties of low-income urban families, focusing on low-rent housing and 
affordable housing. 
In this situation, China has entered an era in which VC can be implemented to improve 
financial defects due to the support of real estate market. In other words, China’s real estate 
market not only has a great price on property, but also focuses on the healthy and sustainable 
development that can benefit to local community.  
 
 
Figure 2. Average price of housing price in China (2000-2019) (Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, 2019; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018) 
 
     Recently, China has undergone the China–US trade war that brings uncertainties for 
China’s real estate market. The average price of a property in China has not been affected 
significantly, but the growth rate of housing prices has slowed down. A report of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (2019), which stated that housing prices are slightly declines in 
the first–tier cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. This may be 
because multinational companies normally located in these cities, and the China-US trade war 
leads to the withdrawal of foreign capital from the Chinese economics market (PERE News, 
2019). In this context, risk of global political and economic situation may influence VC 
development in large cities of China. This because if the housing price falls, the incremental 
land value that can be captured will also decrease. On the other hand, risk of global situation 
may less influence on 2nd and 3rd tiers cities in China.  
 
3.2 Institutional Framework and Policy Environment in China 
 
Traditionally, the State Council is the highest administrative organization of the central 
government of China. The State Council is responsible for planning national economic 




activities, approving and managing urban and rural construction projects, and allocating the 
tasks to the lower level of governments (Li et al., 2016). With regard to capturing value from 
transportation, land use, and funding issues, the ministries and administrations are involved as 
indicated in Figure 3.  
 
 
Figure 3. General administrative structure of the building urban transit system in China 
 
However, rights related to administration, finance, and land-use are largely delegated 
from the central government to local governments, so the decision relating to VC is made by 
local governments, enterprises, developers and many other land-related interests’ groups in 
China (Qian, 2013). Notably, the provincial and central government’s intentions, policies and 
plans are important variables for local development in China (Ng and Tang, 2004). 
Supportive policies also provide the foundation of VC implementation. Especially, the 
policies from the central government offer a motivation for local governments to conduct VC 
at local level. The State Council (2017) prepared the 13th Five-Year Plan with Modern 
Comprehensive Transportation System as the national-level special plan that indicates the 
requirements and directions of transportation development for the period of 2016–2020. This 
Five-Year Plan encouraged the comprehensive utilization of transportation infrastructure and 
the surrounding space, integrating transportation and commerce, business, exhibitions, and 
leisure. 
     In 2017, the Guidelines on Promoting the Development of Municipal (Suburban) 
Railways was jointly published by the National Development and Reform Commission, the 
Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development. This 
policy focused on exploring innovative investment and financial models for developing rail 
transit. The regulation encourages railway-related enterprises (transit agency) to construct a 
comprehensive VC development mechanism through the development of the surrounding 
property, property leasing and management, and commercial development of stations and 
depots (National Development and Reform Commission, 2017).  
Furthermore, the Ministry of Finance (2019) prepared the Opinions on Promoting the 
Normative Development of Cooperation between Government and Social Capital (Private 
Sectors). This document emphasized the invitation of the private sector to participate in the 




field of public services is an important decision-making tool for the central government. The 
document requires that the selection of the private sectors must be achieved by competitive 
means such as public bidding, invitation bidding, or competitive negotiation.  
The role of the community and impact of VC projects on community wellbeing cannot 
be ignored. Doherty (2004) argued that increase in land value is attributed to community 
interventions rather than land owners’ actions and should be recouped by the public sector 
and used for public purposes. In other words, the community has a right to receive the benefit 
of increase in land value in the process of VC. Therefore, the Decision of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning 
Comprehensively Deepening the Reform in the Third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central 
Committee put forward the notion that “establishing a distribution mechanism for increment 
land value that needs to consider the State, collective and individual, and rationally improves 
personal income.” (CPC Central Committee, 2013). It is believed that the rational and 
equitable distribution of land interests should follow the actions of those who have led to the 
creation of increased land value, thus making sure the increase in land value is distributed to 
society for citizens to share, as well as ensuring the land and funds needed for urban 
construction.   
     Overall, these supportive policy statements not only offer an incentive for local 
governments to conduct VC, but also indicate a direction for local governments when 
planning and implementing VC. Local governments can then consider how to address the 
issues about developing VC as; how, by whom, and what revenues distribution measures 
should be used. 
 
3.3 Regulatory Framework 
 
3.3.1 Framework for the land commodification 
Land use and related policies are critical in VC projects because they are related to land value 
rises and how to recoup the increased land value (Suzuki et al., 2015). In China, the land use 
system has experienced continuous reform that provides the implicit possibility of developing 
VC in China. VC is dependent on the notion that land accrues value and that this value can be 
monetized and thus captured (Jillella et al., 2015). In China, a dual land system is employed 
as urban land is state-owned and rural land is collectively owned by local farmers and 
villagers (Ding, 2003). Before the economic reform and opening-up policy of 1978, 
stated-owned companies, governments, schools, and joint ventures, etc. could use the 
state-owned land free for an unlimited period and the Constitution banned land transactions, 
and thus land had no commodity attributes and no value (Liu et al., 2014).  
The land use system in China began to change since 1978, progressing toward land 
commodification. First, because of the opening-up policy, direct foreign investment increased 
and thus the demand for land use rose (Jiang et al., 1998). Therefore, the central government 
developed the land use rights system and allowed foreign investors to use land by leasing 
(paying up-front fees to rent land) for a specific period. In 1986, the central government 
established the Department of Land Administration (now called the Ministry of Natural 
Resource), which is responsible for land policy reform, land allocation and expropriation, 
land development monitoring, comprehensive land use planning, land law implementation, 
and other related work (Ho and Lin, 2003). In 1987, the Shenzhen Municipal Government 
(SMG) conducted three state-owned land transactions through a process of bidding, auction, 
and listing. This was the first land transaction in China.  
After that, the central government prepared a series of legislation and regulations to 
achieve land reform, making land have value and regulating land markets (see Table 2). The 




land can be seen as a valued asset to increase government revenues and to promote urban 
construction and economic development. In this situation, for lands related to VC 
development, the transaction must be conducted by bidding, auction, or listing. Theoretically, 
this kind of land transaction effectively promotes fair and open market competition.  
However, at the same time, the land transaction rules create a regulatory barrier that 
limits the development of VC in China. Rationally, these rules will lead to lands that are not 
necessarily developed by local transit agencies. In this case, private developers are able to 
capture the amount of added land value, in turn, the land transaction rules cannot guarantee 
that local governments and local transit agencies capture an efficient increment land value 
increases (Xue and Fang, 2015).  
 
Table 2. Laws and regulations of land commodification 
Year Document Highlight 
1988 Constitutional Amendment Land use rights can be granted and transferred.  
1988 Land Management Law The right to use state-owned lands and collectively 
owned lands can be transferred, and the state can 
implement a payment mechanism for using the 
state-owned lands. 
1990 The Provisional Regulation on the 
Transfer of the Land Rights over 
State-Owned Land in Cities and 
Towns 
Identifying two levels of the Chinese land market. In 
the first level, the state is the landowner who gives the 
land use rights to land users for a specific period 
through bidding, auctions, or agreement. In the second 
level, the land use rights can be sold, exchanged, or 
donated to other land users. 
The municipal and county governments are responsible 
for the transfer of land use rights. 
2001 Notice on Strengthening the 
Management of State-Owned 
Land Assets 
To ensure the openness and fairness of land 
transactions, municipal governments must vigorously 
promote the bidding and auction of land use rights. If it 
is really impossible to adopt the bidding or auction 
method, the arrangement method can be adopted. The 
results of the agreement are open to the public. 
2002  Regulation of Bidding, Auction, 
and Listing for Transferring 
State-owned Land Use Rights 
Lands for commerce, tourism, residential housing, 
recreational facilities, and mixed use, etc. should be 
sold by bidding, auction, or listing. 
2004 Land Management Law Regulates a top-down land use planning system. 
2007 Property Law  Lands for commerce, tourism, residential housing, 
recreational facilities, and mixed use, etc. should be 
sold by bidding, auction, or listing. 
Source: National People's Congress, 1988; State Council, 2001; Ministry of Natrual Resources, 2002; Ding, 
2003; State Council, 2007; Tian and Ma, 2009 
 
3.3.2 Lack of a property tax system 
As mentioned before, the central government of China promulgated supportive policies for 
VC implementation through property development and property leasing and management. 
Unlike some developed countries such as Australia and the US, taxation-based VC has never 
been considered as a funding tool in China. This because China lacks an effective property tax 
system at all levels, and thus the role of property tax in the local public finance structure is 
very limited (Li and Song, 2008). Consequently, many local governments in China have 
turned to leasing state-owned land for a large lump-sum fee from developers to finance 




infrastructure development and capital projects (Tao et al., 2010), resulting in the utilization 
of development-based VC for developing transportation.  
Second, owner-occupied residential property is not included in the tax base for the 
current real estate tax in China, thus significantly restricting the Chinese government’s ability 
to capture value from the booming housing market (Man, 2012). This indicates that China’s 
current property tax system also lacks a mechanism for capturing incremental increases in 
property value and the government may miss the opportunity to generate more tax revenue. 
     Third, house buyers pay taxes and fees during housing transactions but not during the 
duration of ownership. Therefore, house owners pay property taxes only once, and this rules 
out the possibility of capturing value through continuous improvement-based taxation in 
China (Tang et al., 2011).   
     With respect to the issues in the property tax system in China, the central government 
has tried to conduct property reforms, and selected Shanghai and Chongqing as the property 
tax pilots. The two cities were permitted to collect property taxes on newly purchased second 
homes and luxury residential properties, respectively, in 2011. However, in early 2019, the 
property tax experiment was considered a failure by the central government and scholars 
because the collection of property tax had no effect on house prices and local fiscal revenue in 
Shanghai and Chongqing (First Finance News, 2014). Subsequently, a spokesperson for the 
National People's Congress of China identified that there is no property tax in the legislative 
plan of China in 2019. 
    It is difficult to determine whether taxation-based VC would be useful for the situation in 
China. One the one hand, because of lack of a supportive property tax regulatory framework, 
China does not have the ability to levy property taxation for achieving VC. On the other hand, 
because of the failure of the property tax pilots in Shanghai and Chongqing, the central 
government needs to re-examine whether China's property tax could become the main public 
revenue source, as is the case in most developed countries in the West. If so, what is the 
specific implementation plan for China? In this unknown situation, China currently has only 
limited VC instruments and prefers to use development-based VC, which has been applied in 
many experimental cities such as Chengdu, Nanjing, Shenzhen, Shanghai, and Wuhan. 
    
  
4. SHENZHEN CASE 
 
4.1 Macro Factors in Shenzhen 
 
4.1.1 Urbanization, economic growth, and transportation development 
Shenzhen is located in the south of Guangdong Province, China, adjacent to Hong Kong. 
From 1978 to 2017, the urban population of Shenzhen increased from 0.35 million to 13 
million and its total gross domestic product (GDP) increased from 200 million yuan to 2.5 
trillion yuan. Its urban built-up land increased by 3 km2 from 1979, reaching 993 km2 in 2017. 
(Shenzhen Statics Bureau, 2018). During this time, Shenzhen has implemented a series of 
favorable and flexible policies to attract investment and thus stimulate economic growth 
(Yang et al., 2016). For example, in Shenzhen, the policy regarding land use rights, which 
made land use rights commodities that could be bought and sold through bidding, auction or 
listing, was the first to be tested in China.  
Shenzhen has performed well in its process of urbanization and economic growth. 
However, the rapid development has caused a shortage of land resources and high population 
density, similar to Hong Kong. For example, in recent years, the average supply of urban 
built-up land in Shenzhen has been only 12 km2. The population density of Shenzhen is as 




high as 5,963 people per km2, which is about 41 times higher than the national average of 
China (Shenzhen Statics Bureau, 2018). As some interviewees noted that: 
“Shenzhen learned lessons from Hong Kong because the macro conditions 
are very similar. Like Hong Kong, Shenzhen has a shortage of land, and 
high population density, so it advocates to optimizing land utilization.” 
(Planner 1 and official 2, interview, 2019) 
Shenzhen has experienced the negative impacts of motorization such as traffic 
congestion and air pollution, raising the demand for a good public transit system. In 2007, 
when the private car ownership exceeded 1 million, the Shenzhen Municipal Government 
(SMG) issued the Suggestions on Implementation of Priority Development of Urban Public 
Transport in Shenzhen. This policy document determines the goals of rail transit development 
in Shenzhen: (1) accelerating the construction of a rail transit system; (2) building an urban 
rail system that is coordinated with land use and the spatial layout; and (3) forming an urban 
passenger transport system with rail transit as its backbone as soon as possible (Shenzhen 
Municipal Government, 2007).  
Following Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou, Shenzhen has become the fifth 
Chinese city to own a metro system (36 cities in China now have metro systems). Shenzhen 
Metro Corporation (SZMC) operates eight lines, with total of 199 stations and 285 kilometres 
of track (see Figure 4). Five million passengers uses these metro lines everyday (Shenzhen 
Metro Corporation, 2019). 
 
 
Figure 4. Shenzhen Metro Map (Shenzhen Metro Corporation, 2019) 
 
SZMC was established on 31 July 1998. It is a local state-owned enterprise directly 
controlled by the SMG; the senior managers are appointed by the SMG. 
 “Hong Kong Government has 75% shares in the MTR, while the SZMC is 
100% owned by the SMG.” (Official 4, interview, 2019) 
The main businesses of SZMC covers metro construction, metro operation, property 
development, investment and financing, and resource management and property management. 




All shares of the company belong to the Shenzhen State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, which is the government department that manages government 
investments in state-owned enterprises. 
 
4.1.2 Real estate market in Shenzhen 
Since the commodification of land-use rights, the real estate market has played an important 
role in facilitating urban development in Shenzhen (Zhang, 2000) . Shenzhen conducted the 
first land transaction in China before the Constitutional Amendment and it also took the lead 
in reforming China’s housing system. Shenzhen ceased the allocation of affordable housing 
under a planned economy, and realized the commercialization of housing and affordable 
housing development, led by the local government.  
Based on the decision set by the central government to stop the allocation of affordable 
housing, the real estate industry has become one of the key industries in Shenzhen and 
housing prices have increased dramatically. Following the trend of housing prices across the 
country, Shenzhen’s housing market has shown a steady upward trend but with slight declines 
during the global financial crisis in 2008 and Shenzhen’s housing purchase restriction policy 
in 2011. Moreover, due to the China-US trade war, Shenzhen’s housing prices fell slightly 
again (see Figure 5). As an open economy city, Shenzhen is very sensitive to international 
political and economic changes. Therefore, stabilizing Shenzhen's housing prices is extremely 
important, and the central government actively seeks solutions. For example, in November 
2019, the central government in collaboration with the Hong Kong Government to formulate 
a new policy that allows Hong Kong residents to purchase houses in mainland cities of 
Greater Bay Area (Guangdong Province, Hong Kong, and Macao). This new policy expects to 
attract Hong Kong people buy properties in Shenzhen and other cities in Guangdong Province. 
It also provides more housing, living space, education, and job opportunities to Hong Kong 
residents and may benefit to address massive protest in Hong Kong. However, Hong Kong 
residents may consider that their capital might has been transferred to mainland China (BBC 
News, 2019).  
 
 
Figure 5. Housing price in Shenzhen 2002-2019 (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2019; 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018) 
 
Although such external political and economic uncertainties may influence Shenzhen’s 
real estate market, the housing prices in Shenzhen are still among the most expensive in China. 
In this case, land sales revenue is still an important source of funding for urban infrastructure 
development, such as the construction of an urban rail transit network, a high-speed road 




network, water supply, gas supply, airport and other infrastructure in Shenzhen. In addition, 
because of the shortage of land resources in Shenzhen, high housing prices provide strong 
motivation for real estate developers to carry out urban development projects such as urban 
renewal and suburban development. Hence, the real estate market in Shenzhen offers an 
opportunity to develop development-based VC via the Rail + Property model. One 
interviewee from SZMC stated that: 
“In fact, Shenzhen's VC was also proposed in the context of the global 
financial crisis of 2008. Although Shenzhen's housing prices were slightly 
affected at that time, it was both a challenge and an opportunity. Certainly, 
I can say that there is no problem in the real estate market environment in 
Shenzhen. Our housing building is not worried about no person to buy. 
Shenzhen's job opportunities, salary and urban development have attracted 
lots of people, so it is well-known that Shenzhen is now an immigrant city.” 
(Manager in SZMC, interview, 2019) 
 
4.2 VC Mechanisms in Shenzhen: Developing Institutional Mechanism  
 
Shenzhen is a pioneer in exploring the VC mechanism in China. The first phase of urban rail 
transit construction was funded by the SMG (70%) and bank loans (30%); the application of 
VC happened in the second and third phases of urban rail transit construction in Shenzhen. As 
of November 2017, VC projects under construction have a combined area of 3 million m3 and 
seven projects were sold to the real estate market. The areas for sale are about 600,000 m2 
with a price exceeding 44 billion yuan. Since the first VC project was launched in Shenzhen 
in 2013, the revenues from the VC mechanism have exceeded 25 billion yuan (SZMC, 2018). 
 
4.2.1 VC method: land transaction with special conditions 
In the second phase of urban rail transit construction, the SMG and SZMC launched the R+P 
model for land development. This model basically follows the same practice in Hong Kong 
but has been formulated according to the land use laws and regulations related to Mainland 
China. Specifically, the SMG transfers lands by bidding, auction or listing to the SZMC. To 
ensure that SZMC can obtain land parcels, the SMG sets special conditions for bidding, 
auction or listing. For example, the special conditions specify that bidders must have the goals 
of constructing and operating an urban transit rail system with its ancillary facilities and 
related land use for one or more lines. In this case, the SMG prevents non-metro owing 
private developers winning the bidding. However, some experts expressed their concerns 
during interviews: 
“This method is actually a 1.0 version of Shenzhen’s VC, but it has been 
copied by many cities in China. This method can indeed bypass the existing 
regulatory restrictions, because there is no clear requirement for land 
transactions that cannot be carried out under special conditions. However, 
there is no doubt that this method has undermined market competition.” 
(Expert 2 and Expert 3, interview, 2019) 
In this institutional mechanism of VC method, the Shenzhen Land and Real Estate 
Trading Center offers a plan for conducting the land transaction, and the SZMC gives a land 
use payment to the Shenzhen Municipal Finance Bureau at first. Then the Shenzhen Finance 
Bureau transfers the payment to the Shenzhen State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission. After receiving land lease payments, the Shenzhen State-owned 




Assets Supervision and Administration Commission transfers the payment back to the SZMC 
as registered capital from the Shenzhen Finance Bureau. Other main stakeholders in this kind 
of VC method include the Shenzhen Development and Reform Commission (responsible for 
project approval), the Shenzhen Planning and Natural Resources Bureau (responsible for the 
adjustment of regulatory planning, construction planning approval, and land supply) and the 
Rail Transit Office (Responsible for coordination and cooperation) (see Figure 6). Through 
this process, the SMG not only grants land use rights to the SZMC for free, but it also allows 
the SZMC to capture most of the incremental land value, and thus the financial status of the 
SZMC can be improved significantly. 
“The SMG sets the Rail Transit Office to take charge of coordination and 
cooperation in the VC process. In order to facilitate communication, the 
Rail Transit Office is not in the government building, but in the building 
where the SZMC is located.” 
 
 
Figure 6. The VC mechanism 1 in Shenzhen (developed based on interview)   
 
4.2.2 VC method: land value as investment capital (LVIC) 
Another VC method to be used during the third phase of rail transit construction in Shenzhen. 
The metro lines to be built under this model are about 244 kilometers and 153 stations, with a 




total investment of 144 billion yuan (SZMC, 2018). The SMG plans not to make cash 
allocations for the third phase of rail transit projects. Instead, it has prepared 5.66 million m2 
of land plots so the SZMC can recoup the costs of construction and operation. One 
interviewee said during the interview 
“The SZMC has begun to make a profit. The SZMC has 12 VC projects 
involving eight land plots are funded by LVIC, and 4 land plots are acquired 
by bidding, auction or listing with special conditions. It can be said that and 
most of the contribution of the profit is from the LVIC method” (official 2, 
interview, 2019) 
Importantly, in 2012, the Shenzhen Land Management System Reform Overall Plan was 
jointly approved by the Ministry of Nature Resources and Guangdong Provincial Government. 
In this case, with the support of higher-level governments, land value can be considered as 
investment capital that can be directly put into project development in Shenzhen. Furthermore, 
to support the SZMC, the SMG prepared the targeted policy entitled Interim Measures for 
Land Value as Investment Capital of State-owned Land Use Right in Shenzhen in 2013. The 
policy clearly points out that the LVIC has been tested and applied by three companies, 
including the SZMC, Shenzhen Airport Enterprise and the Special Economic Zone 
Construction and Development Enterprise (SMG, 2013). It implies that under this institutional 
mechanism, to better cooperate with the SZMC, the SMG issued this new policy to help and 
protect the implementation of VC. Specifically, the Shenzhen Development and Reform 
Commission formulates an annual investment and financing plan at first, and then the 
Shenzhen Planning and Natural Resources Bureau is in charge of formulating an annual plan 
for LVIC and conducts the site location. After that, the land use plan for LVIC and the price of 
land will be identified by relevant governmental departments including the Shenzhen 
Development and Reform Commission, the Shenzhen Planning and Natural Resources 
Bureau, the Shenzhen Finance Bureau, and the Shenzhen State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission. Importantly, based on the assessment of land price, the 
Shenzhen Planning and Natural Resources Bureau, the Shenzhen State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission, and the SZMC sign the tripartite contract for 
land acquisition rather than through the processes of bidding, auction or listing. It implies that 
the SZMC can directly get the land for property development. Finally, the SZMC completes 
the capital registration. Figure. 7 shows the mechanism of the LVIC in Shenzhen.  
Undoubtedly, Shenzhen has become a pioneer and experiment city again, seeking to 
implement innovative VC mechanisms in China. Theoretically, this method helps the SZMC 
not have to raise high land transfer costs, at the same time, the SMG allows the SZMC to hold 
all of the incremental land value. In the interviews, some interviewees also highlighted the 
advantages of LVIC, for example: 
“This method protects the market competition mechanism, that is, no longer 
takes special conditions to bid, auction or list. Moreover, this method saves 
costs including land use fees and time.” (Planner 1, interview, 2019) 
“[…] By contrast, LVIC only needs to assess the land value and complete 
the tripartite contract, so the SZMC can think about the overall layout of 
the property development earlier without any concern, and the efficiency is 
higher.” (Planner 4, interview, 2019) 
 





Figure 7. The VC mechanism 2 of LVIC (developed based on interview) 
 
In addition, the SMG emphasizes the combination of building affordable housing and 
applying the VC mechanism in Shenzhen. The SMG has attempted to distribute the captured 
land value increase to local citizens. Through the provision of affordable housing, local 
citizens, especially low-income people, can lower the cost of buying homes. For example, in 
the Qian Hai Depot Project, as the first VC project in Shenzhen and in Mainland China, the 
SMG requested that the SZMC build 12,363 units of affordable housing, covering an area of 
134,765.63 m2 (SZMC, 2018). 
“The effectiveness of Shenzhen VC is not only reflected in economic benefits, 
but also in social benefits. Shenzhen Metro (SZMC) has built about 30% of 
the affordable housing in Shenzhen for the municipal government (SMG), 
solving the housing needs of low-income and young people.” (Expert 2, 
interview, 2019) 
Moreover, as mentioned before, China lacks a property tax system and thus local 
citizens will not be charged ongoing taxes for living in these affordable housing units, even in 
commercial housing. In this situation, some local citizens can enjoy a better quality of life 
without paying extra costs.  
 




5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 
This paper aims to identify opportunities and challenges to implement VC in China. By using 
the institutional dimension of partnership as a theoretical framework and Shenzhen as a case 
study, the paper explores the macro factors (such as urbanization trend, economic growth, 
transport development and the real estate market); China’s regulatory framework (such as 
land commodification and property tax system) and wider policies in general and Shenzhen in 
particular has implemented.  
 
5.1 Macro Environment 
   
This paper shows that Shenzhen translated Hong Kong’s VC mechanism in their local context 
and currently leading VC debate in China. Shenzhen has similar urban characteristics to Hong 
Kong such as high population density, the scarcity of lands, and good economic performance 
(see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Urban Characteristics in Shenzhen and Hong Kong 
Characteristics Shenzhen Hong Kong 
Population (million) 13  7.5  
Population density (people per 
km2) 
5963 6777 
Area (km2) 2050  1111  
Urban built-up area (km2) 993  270  
GDP 2.42 trillion yuan 2.40 trillion yuan 
Source: Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong, 2018; Shenzhen Statics Bureau, 2018 
 
On the one hand, Shenzhen and Hong Kong's urban density and built-up area are 
conducive to the construction of their respective urban rail transit systems, which can tackle 
the problems of congestion and accessibility in both cities. In addition, the ease of travel has 
been improved by offering high-quality of metro stations and public services. By using an 
urban rail transit system, economic agglomeration generated by Shenzhen and Hong Kong’s 
high urban densities can translate to higher property prices. These conditions offer a 
foundation for increasing the land and property value close to transit stations and for 
conducting VC.  
On the other hand, like Hong Kong, Shenzhen has an extremely strong and booming 
real estate market. A strong real estate market can help attract private developers to cultivate 
real estate plans around the rail transit station and improve the feasibility of the project (Tang 
et al., 2004). Cervero and Murakami (2008) argued that the integration of real estate market 
and urban transit rail development is theoretically sound, socially desirable and economically 
attractive in Hong Kong. Likewise, if without the booming real estate market, Shenzhen 
would lack capacity to learn from the successful experience of the Hong Kong’s Rail + 
Property model as low property prices cannot support the efficient funding return. 
Nevertheless, the real estate markets are easily impacted by the global political and economic 
risks. As mentioned earlier, Shenzhen and major mainland cities’ property prices have been 
influenced by the China–US trade war. Similarly, the trade tension between China and US and 
the massive protest in Hong Kong already impacted the economic situations and outlook of 
Hong Kong. For example, Hong Kong MTRC as a major real estate developer, and its stock 




value dropped approximately 3.4% at Hong Kong stock exchange (CNN News, 2019). Thus, 
it is necessary to realize that the global risks of political and economic situations may 
significantly damage the stable and healthy real estate market. 
Not surprisingly, cities in China which are now exploring VC mechanism are all major 
cities such as first-tier cities and provincial capital cities with large population, high urban 
densities, good performance of GDP, huge demand for transportation, and strong real estate 
markets. These macro factors generate a favorable environment for VC initiatives at local 
levels. However, VC cannot be isolated from the global political and economic challenges, 
and the Chinese central and local governments should actively incorporate and address such 
risks using effective mechanisms, policies and regulations in their policy documents.  
 
5.2 Regulatory Framework and Institutional Capacity  
 
5.2.1 The property tax system  
There is no doubt that the VC experiment of Shenzhen has achieved some successes, but there 
are still some challenges and barriers to translate VC in the context of China. Because of the 
lack of an efficient property tax system, VC instruments in China are limited. In the case of 
Shenzhen, the municipal government did not consider a taxation-based VC method. A debate 
has emerged as to whether the establishment of a property tax system would improve the 
current socio-economic situation of China. On the one hand, according to the experience of 
Western developed countries such as the US, local governments use most of the property tax 
to pay for education, public security, and the public environment, so that the surrounding 
environment of the district improves. People are also willing to pay such taxes for the benefits 
they can obtain. Hence, establishing and levying taxes for land added-value in areas 
benefiting from the development of a transportation system is reasonable (Zhao et al., 2010).  
In China, local communities have enjoyed living improvements tax-free for a long time. 
Even in an open city like Shenzhen, the local government may be afraid of touching the 
property tax issue, avoiding opposition from the local community. The central government 
also expresses this attitude to property tax, following a top-down approach, with legislation 
first, full authorization next, and proceeding step by step (China News, 2018). Hence, no city 
in China is currently exploring a taxation-based VC method. However, like Hong Kong, this 
situation can bring great benefits for taxpayers, which is vital for the success of VC. Of course, 
this situation carries an underlying risk. Specifically, in the case of Shenzhen, the current VC 
methods excessively rely on its real estate market. Theoretically, when the real estate market 
is sluggish, the income from VC will fall accordingly (Hui et al., 2004). The dependence of 
income on market conditions may create unstable financial pressure on the government. In 
this situation, the land use system ideally has the capacity to impose taxes efficiently and 
effectively. Nevertheless, the property tax experiment in Shanghai and Chongqing were 
failures. This regulatory barrier will take a long time to solve in China, and central and local 
governments need to rethink what means of taxation are rational in the context of China. If 
this issue could be addressed, China could increase the number of VC instruments and have 
more options when planning a VC strategy. 
 
5.2.2 Bypassing land transaction regulations: building institutional capacity 
Based on the Property Law and the Regulation of Bidding, Auction, and Listing for 
Transferring State-owned Land Use Rights, the lands for commerce, tourism, residential 
housing, recreational facilities, and mixed use, etc. should be sold by bidding, auction, or 
listing. This means that land acquisition of VC cannot adopt Hong Kong’s style (i.e., by 
agreement). The ideal situation would be that, like Hong Kong, the transit agency is a key 




body in the VC project, and the government and the transit agency enjoy most of the benefits 
from recouping the increased land value. In the case of Shenzhen, the SMG used bidding, 
action or listing with special conditions to ensure that the SZMC could win the transaction. 
This method has been used by other Chinese cities such as Chengdu, Nanjing, and Nanchang. 
Theoretically, transferring land use rights through open bidding, auction or listing can 
promote transparency and competitiveness land transaction, thus guaranteeing the local 
government's land revenues. Some local governments set special conditions for bidders to 
help the promotion of VC, indicating that local governments have delayed market competition 
to some extent and has paid more attention to the capacity and experience of bidders. This is a 
controversial practice, especially as China is now strongly promoting a market economy. 
However, the reality is that bidding with special conditions is useful for VC development in 
China, at least in the short-term.  
Importantly, building capacity of local institutions is critical for designing and 
implementing VC mechanism. Initially, the SMG manages land transactions by restricting 
bidders other than the SZMC. In this case, even though the VC projects has been implemented, 
they lack the real land value because no bidding and auction were undertaken to ensure the 
transparency and competitiveness of land transaction. Recently, the SMG and the SZMC try 
to explore another innovative LVIC method that will consider land value as investment capital 
to implement VC projects. The LVIC method implies that the SMG and the SZMC mobilize 
land resources through institutional innovation and create an enabling environment to bypass 
barriers to land transactions. A targeted policy was specially prepared for supporting the LVIC 
instrument. Moreover, this method can avoid the huge cost of land acquisition for the transit 
agency, as well as increasing the capital of the transit agency. It improves legitimacy and 
transparency as local government could assess land value as per the market before signing the 
contract with the SZMC. However, the problem appears as the LVIC method has not been 
covered in the regulatory framework at either the national or local levels. Considering 
different institutional capacities among other cities across China, local governments should 
carefully examine their institutional capacities. 
   In summary, Shenzhen’s experience moves from copying the Hong Kong’s VC model to 
build their own capacity that include contextual factors in managing their VC projects. The 
case study of Shenzhen offers insights into considering how both local government and local 
transit agency can improve institutional capacity to help VC become successful and more 
rationality. 
 
5.3 Policy Implications and Future Study  
 
This paper concludes that the institutional nature of partnership plays an important role in 
creating an environment to enable VC initiatives in China. Specifically, the opportunities of a 
favorable macro-environment, and supportive regulations and policies help Chinese cities are 
implementing VC projects. However, the VC mechanism in Chinese regulatory framework 
such as land transaction method is creating a barrier to VC. Lacking a property tax system 
also leads to limited access to VC instrument. The case of Shenzhen implies that local 
governments and transit agencies can circumvent current regulations and successfully 
implement VC, as well as providing the revenues of VC that local communities can enjoy in 
some form in China. In order to facilitate the use of VC in China, we offer some policy 
implications.  
 
1) The success of Shenzhen’s VC projects is related to regional contexts which impact 
on urbanization, rapid economic development, transportation demand, and the 




support of the real estate market. Other Chinese cities should carefully consider their 
institutional capacity before launching VC projects. Perhaps, the central government 
should prepare pre-requisite targets such as GDP, population, urban density, public 
transport patronage, and strength of local real-estate market, for the use of VC in 
development projects. It can benefit to local governments to assess the 
macro-economic situations, avoiding the VC failures. Moreover, governments 
policies should incorporate the risks emerged from the global political and economic 
situations in order to ensuring a stable environment to implement VC.     
2) The central and local governments should prepare regulatory framework to 
operationalize the VC concept. Recently, although some governments have 
introduced the regulations and policies of land transaction, all levels of governments 
have not yet formulated a set of standardized and systematic regulations and policies 
for VC development in China. 
3) Building institutional capacity is important to implement VC mechanism successfully. 
Institutional capacity can be developed by considering and incorporating local 
factors and realities in VC mechanism. This may include establishing new units, 
supportive regulations, procedures and human resource capacity.  
4) The Chinese governments should develop a mechanism to redistribute the benefits of 
VC projects in local communities. For example, VC projects generates benefits for 
the community, including reduced travel time, increased employment, environmental 
health benefits, property value increases. In Hong Kong, besides these benefits, Hong 
Kong Government advocates the gain in revenues should be returned to the local 
community instead of subsidizing the developers. In the case of Shenzhen, besides 
the improved accessibility, amenity, and economic agglomeration can be enjoyed by 
local communities, the SMG has also paid attention to affordable housing. The SMG 
has transferred this responsibility to the SZMC, and the SZMC can offer affordable 
housing by itself or through private developers. However, the combination of VC 
with affordable housing is only case by case bases without any supportive laws, 
regulations, and policies. Moreover, the proportion of affordable housing will 
directly affect the income from the VC projects and thus some local governments in 
China may give preference to economic benefits to ensure good government 
performance. In this case, it is important to develop a clear policy and regulatory 
mechanisms to redistribute the benefits of VC projects to local community.  
 
Overall, this paper develops a better understanding of VC mechanisms in China and 
discusses opportunities and limitations of VC prospects in Chinese cities. Also, it offers some 
implications to cities that attempt to adopt and implement VC. The next phase of the research 
will focus on the financial and social partnerships of stakeholders to understanding the 
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